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In ‘Survival and Identity’, David Lewis (1976a) defends a psychological theory of 
personal identity and a stage-sharing treatment of fission and fusion.1 Standard cases of 
personal fission, Lewis holds, involve exactly two people; these people share all their 
pre-fission stages but not their post-fission stages. They are like overlapping roads that 
share their initial segment (their ‘trunk’) but diverge at a fork. Fusion is handled in a 
similar way.  
 One nice feature of Lewis’s theory is that its verdicts about fission and fusion are 
not ad hoc stipulations. They are logical consequences of the elegant ‘non-circular 
definition of personhood’ at the heart of the theory:      
 
 (L) something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of 
person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is 
R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate. 
(1976a: 22) 
 
Another consequence of (L) is that personhood is maximal, where a property is maximal 
if and only if it is impossible that a thing and one of its proper parts both have the 
property.2 But this is a bug, not a feature. As Michael Burke (2003: 112) has pointed out 
(though not in connection with (L)), there are counterexamples to the maximality of 
personhood.3 A person could be a part of another, much larger person with a completely 
separate mental life. The counterexamples are obvious enough that there’s already a word 
for them: homunculi.4 
Admittedly, the homunculus example is exotic and probably non-actual, but this 
does not diminish its relevance. Lewis intends his theory to hold ‘not only for the cases 
that arise in real life, but for all possible problem cases as well’ (1976a: 22),5 and he 
places great weight on cases involving adult human fission, which are hardly less exotic 
                                                
1 Everything that I say about fission and fusion in this paper can also be said, mutatis mutandis, about what 
Lewis calls ‘longevity’.    
2 To say that x is a proper part of y is to say that x is a part of, but not identical to, y. Strictly speaking, the 
maximality of personhood is a consequence not of (L) but of its necessitation, which Lewis endorses, given 
that he offers (L) as a definition. 
3 Lewis (1983: 41) offers a definition, call it (M), of ‘modal continuant’ that is parallel to (L), and which 
suffers from a parallel bug, modulo the fact that ‘modal continuant’, unlike ‘person’, is a technical term. 
Those who, unlike Lewis, wish to treat people as modal continuants will want to debug (M) in the manner I 
debug (L).   
4 In literature, and in 17th century preformationist hereditary theory, a homunculus is a tiny person or 
humanoid, often embedded within an ordinary person. 
5 In this passage Lewis is referring to his claim that the I-relation and the R-relation are coextensive, but it 
is clear that he takes (L) to be metaphysically necessary as well, given the role it plays in determining the 
extension of the I-relation, and given that he calls it a definition. On the R-relation, see section 2. On the I-
relation, see note 15. 
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than homunculus cases. So if the homunculus case is even metaphysically possible, it is a 
problem for Lewis’s definition.  
In section 4, I note that Lewis is especially vulnerable to the counterexample, 
given his views on personhood, mental properties, and the extent of metaphysical 
possibility. I then show, in section 5, that Lewis’s definition is remarkably easy to debug. 
A conservative repair, which retains all the virtues of (L) and introduces no new vices, is 
just a minor amendment away.6  
 
2. Preliminaries 
Three expressions in (L) require comment. (i) ‘Person-stage’ is primitive, but it can be 
glossed as ‘an instantaneous or very short-lived entity that is sufficiently person-like, 
especially with regard to its psychological profile’. (ii) ‘x is R-related to y (simpliciter)’ 
can defined as ‘x and y are each person-stages, and either (a) x is to some extent under 
the intentional control of y and y is accessible in memory to x, or (b) vice versa, or (c) 
x=y’.7 R-relatedness, according to Lewis, is a relation of psychological connectedness 
that is reflexive (over the domain of person-stages) and symmetric but not necessarily 
transitive. (iii) ‘Aggregate’ is defined as ‘mereological sum’:8 x is a mereological sum of 
plurality yy if and only if each of yy is a part of x and each part of x overlaps (shares a 
part with) at least one of yy.9 I will use ‘aggregate’ and ‘sum’ interchangeably. I assume 
that parthood is reflexive and transitive and that each plurality has exactly one sum.10  
 
3. The bug 
The maximality clause in (L) is motivated by the following thought. The proper temporal 
part11 of (e.g.) Lincoln that runs from the beginning of 1850 to the end of 1859, call it 
1850s-Lincoln, is an R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages, but it is not a person. So 
‘person’ must not be defined simply as ‘R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages’. In an 
ordinary case, a proper temporal part of a person is an R-interrelated aggregate of person-
stages but is not a person.  
One natural alternative is (L). Since 1850s-Lincoln is a proper part of another R-
interrelated aggregate of person-stages (e.g., Lincoln himself), (L) counts 1850s-Lincoln 
as a non-person. So far, so good.  
However, a harder case for (L) is this: 
 
                                                
6 Hudson (2001: 144) proposes a sophisticated account of what it is to be a human person (as opposed to a 
person simpliciter). A variant of the homunculus case serves as a counterexample to Hudson’s account if it 
is possible that both of the people in the case are human people (of which I am uncertain).   
7 This is my paraphrase of Lewis (1976a: 23-24).  
8 Lewis (1976a: 39, note 4) says that ‘mereological sum’ is his preferred interpretation of ‘aggregate’ but 
that other interpretations would work as well. In other work he shows no hesitation about treating people as 
mereological sums of stages.           
9 I use ‘xx’, ‘yy’, etc., as plural variables, which range over pluralities, and I treat ‘is one of’ as primitive. 
To say that xx are among yy is to say that, for each z, if z is one xx, then z is one of yy. To say that xx are 
other than yy is to say that there is some z such that either z is one of xx but not one of yy, or z is one of yy 
but not one of xx. On plural logic, see Lewis (1991) and Linnebo (2016). 
10 See Lewis (1991), Hovda (2009), and Varzi (2016). 
11 The proper temporal parts of a thing are proper parts of the thing. On the definition of ‘temporal part’, 
see Sider (2001: 55-62).  
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Allyson. Allyson is a sum of aa, which are some instantaneous, R-interrelated 
person-stages, and which are not among any other R-interrelated plurality of 
person-stages. Indeed, none of aa is R-related to anything that is not one of aa.  
Allyson is physically and psychologically just like an ordinary human 
being who lives for 95 years. However, Allyson is a proper part of a vastly larger 
conscious being.  
This larger being, call it Zebulon, is a sum of some (extremely large) 
instantaneous person-stages, zz, which are R-interrelated. Zebulon is not a proper 
part of any other R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages, and none of zz is R-
related to anything that is not one of zz. None of aa is one of zz, though each part 
of each of aa overlaps at least one of zz. (In other words, no part of any of aa is 
disjoint from each of zz.12) Many of zz have parts that are disjoint from each of aa.  
Zebulon and Allyson both have whatever psychological features (self-
consciousness, higher-order desires, etc.) are deemed relevant to personhood. But 
Zebulon and Allyson are as separate psychologically as any two people ever have 
been. Neither of them is aware of or remembers any experience had by the other, 
and neither is under the intentional control of the other. Allyson is usually happy 
and thinks mainly about numbers and sports. Zebulon is usually depressed and 
thinks about mainly about literature.  
 
The details can be specified in different ways. Perhaps Zebulon is the ‘system’ composed 
of a Searle (1980)-style Chinese Room and its contents, including Allyson; and this 
system is implementing a mentality-generating computer program. Perhaps Zebulon is a 
Block (1980)-style Nation of China, and Allyson is one of its human neuron-surrogates. 
(Searle and Block would in both cases deny that Zebulon is conscious, but many 
disagree.) Perhaps Zebulon is an organism-like entity, trillions of light years across, 
whose cell-analogues are composed of super-clusters of galaxies, one of which is 
inhabited by Allyson.  
 Details aside, the key is this. Zebulon is an R-interrelated aggregate of person-
stages and is not a proper part of any other such aggregate. So, according to (L), he is a 
person. Allyson is a proper part of an R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages, namely 
Zebulon. So, according to (L), she is not a person. In fact, however, both Allyson and 
Zebulon are people, at least given a broadly psychological approach to personhood, 
which I will not challenge here. So (L) is incorrect. Allyson is a counterexample to (L).  
   
4. Escape routes blocked 
In this section I mention a few strategies for resisting the example, and I note, in a mostly 
ad hominem fashion, that they are not open to Lewisians, given Lewis’s views on related 
topics. 
 Route 1. One might deny that the appropriate network of causal relations could be 
implemented on a super-human scale. For example, one might deny that a billion people 
could use radios to signal to one another in a way that mirrors the neuronal firing patterns 
in the brain of a conscious human being, as in Block’s Nation of China case.  
                                                
12 ‘x is disjoint from y’ means ‘x does not overlap y’. 
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 However, even if this is nomically impossible, presumably it is still 
metaphysically possible, which is the relevant type of modality. Given Lewis’s liberal 
views about what is metaphysically possible (including backward causation and 
backward time travel (1976b), causation via magic spells (1983:76), person-stages 
appearing ex nihilo and vanishing into thin air (1983: 76), interpenetrating, non-
interacting systems of matter and energy (1986: 72), and alien properties (1986: 92)), 
Lewisians ought to grant that there is a metaphysically possible world at which the 
relevant causal facts obtain. 
 Route 2. One might grant the possibility of a world in which these causal facts 
obtain but deny that the ‘Zebulon object’ has mental properties in such a world, and so 
deny that it counts as a person. Perhaps, e.g., mental properties can only arise from causal 
interactions between neurons, whereas Zebulon’s mental properties, if such there be, 
would arise only from causal interactions between non-neurons. Lewis, however, reduces 
mental properties to the occupants of certain causal roles (e.g., 1986a: 106) and endorses 
the possibility of entities that have mental properties despite lacking neurons (1983: 123). 
According to his theory of mind, the relevant causal facts13 suffice for Zebulon’s having 
mental properties.   
 Route 3. One might deny that Allyson’s stages, aa, are person-stages, on the 
grounds that (i) being a person-stage is maximal, and (ii) each of aa is a proper part of 
some person-stage, one of zz.  
 This suggestion fails for two reasons. First, the Allyson case does not entail (ii), 
but only that no part of any of aa is disjoint from each of zz. That is consistent with the 
proposition that none of aa is a part of any of zz. Perhaps, e.g., each of aa is 
instantaneous only in a certain inertial frame, F, whereas each of zz is instantaneous only 
in a different inertial frame, F*, so that each of aa overlaps many of zz but is a part of 
none of zz. Second, if (ii) were built in to the Allyson case, that case would serve as 
forceful counterexample to (i), the maximality of person-stage-hood. 
   
5. Lewis’s definition debugged 
Here is the amended definition: 
  
(L*) x is a continuant person if and only if x is an aggregate of some person-
stages, xx, each of which is R-related to all the rest and to itself, and xx 
are maximal with respect to R-interrelatedness, in the sense they are not 
among some other plurality of person-stages, yy, each of which is R-
related to all the rest and to itself.14  
 
Allyson is an aggregate of some R-interrelated person-stages, aa, that are not among any 
other R-interrelated person-stages. So, although Allyson is a proper part of another R-
                                                
13 Lewis’s theory of mental properties (1983: 122-132) requires that we add certain assumptions about 
which properties occupy which causal roles in the population to which Zebulon belongs. Consider it done. 
14 The use of plural logic is dispensable. (L*) can be stated terms of sets: x is a person if and only if x is an 
aggregate of some set S of person-stages, where each member of S is R-related to itself and to every other 
member of S, and S is maximal with respect to R-interrelatedness, in the sense that S is not a subset of 
some other set S* of person-stages such that each member of S* is R-related to itself and to every other 
member of S*. (To say that x is an aggregate/sum of a set S is to say that each member of S is a part of x 
and each part of x overlaps at least one member of S.)  
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interrelated aggregate of person-stages (Zebulon), (L*) counts her as a person. The key 
fact is that aa are not among zz, nor are aa among any other R-interrelated plurality of 
person-stages. Indeed, none of aa is identical to any of zz. (Each of aa, but none of zz, is 
human-sized.) 15 
 (L*) yields the same result as (L) when applied to Zebulon. Zebulon is an R-
interrelated aggregate of person-stages, zz, which are not among any other R-interrelated 
plurality of person-stages. So (L*), like (L), counts Zebulon as a person, as desired.  
I leave it to the reader to check that (L*) yields the same verdicts on ordinary 
cases, and on standard cases of fission and fusion, as does (L). So, since (L*) retains the 
virtues of (L) and avoids one of its vices without adding any new ones, I recommend that 
Lewisians replace (L) with (L*).16  
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